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MR. FINLAY: Before commenting on Mr. Griffin's paper, I would like 
to make a few preliminary remarks. In the first place, since I am listed 
as a former manager of the Government Relations Department of the 
Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, now the Exxon Corporation, I 
would like to point out that I have been retired for more than four years 
and that I am speaking strictly for myself and I have not discussed what 
I am about to say with anyone. 
The term "multinational corporation" has become a popular catch-
word, but it contributes nothing to the identification or solution of spe-
cific issues. We are in an era of catchwords, ecology, multinational cor-
porations and things of that sort, and if you want to solve problems you 
have to deal, as Mr. Griffin said, "with the facts." Let us get down to 
the facts of a specific problem and solve it on the basis of the facts and 
the relevant law and social policies, and not with catchwords. 
Any corporation doing business in more than one country is a mul-
tinational corporation. It is something that has been going on at least 
since the early days of the British East Indies Company and the Hudson 
Bay Company. The rules under which foreign corporations do business 
within a country have long been established. The illusion, promoted by 
corporation-haters in the newsmedia and elsewhere, that the larger busi-
ness corporations have greater power than the smaller countries in 
which they do business, is pure fantasy, without any foundation in fact. 
I might say here that I am going to talk about Mr. Griffin's comments 
later, but I was a little surprised that he commented, as if it were wrong, 
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that the directors from the American parent companies of Aramco could 
outvote the Saudi Arabian nominee directors on the board of Aramco. 
What are they supposed to do in a business corporation? A business 
corporation runs itself as a business corporation and its relations with 
the government are something else. It certainly is not a source of alarm 
that a business corporation could vote to run its own affairs within the 
rules under which it does business. 
Now there may have been a time when there was occasional justifi-
cation for the statement that the big corporations had greater power 
than governments, but it passed out of the picture with the demise of 
gunboat diplomacy, if it ever existed at all. Today, the smallest country 
within its own borders has an inordinate degree of power over the largest 
corporations in the world. Witness what is happening to American in-
vestments in country after country: Peru, Chile, and the oil exporting 
countries. I have before me a clipping taken out of this week's issue of 
The Oil and Gas Journal.' The headline is not unusual these days: 
"Mobil surrenders in Libya, accepts 51 % participation." Now, that is 
not 51 percent participation by Mobil, in its 100 percent investment; it 
is 51 percent participation by the Libyan government. The article goes 
on to say that the Libyan government, since last September, has exer-
cised effective control of 51 percent of Mobil's crude output, and earlier 
in the year announced 100 percent nationalization of three holdouts 
under the 51 percent nationalization law. That is just a sample. 
This action must be evaluated in the light of the Resolution on 
Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources adopted by the United 
Nations General Assembly on December 17, 1973.2 I might say here that 
Mr. Griffin is not up to date. He talked about an ECOSOC Resolution. 
Well, this Resolution of December 17, 1973, which was a General Assem-
bly resolution, is based on the ECOSOC Resolution. It was passed by 
the top Assembly, however, and not by the subordinate ECOSOC Coun-
cil. The pertinent portion that I wanted to mention is in paragraph 3: 
. . . Affirms that the application of the principle of nationalization 
carried out by States, as an expression of their sovereignty in order to 
safeguard their natural resources, implies that each State is entitled to 
determine the amount of possible compensation and the mode of pay-
ment and that any disputes which might arise should be settled in 
accordance with the national legislation of each State carrying out such 
measures. 
Now, this is fortified with other paragraphs that deplore any armed 
aggression, economic coercion or anything else that would tend to inter-
fere with each state's making its own decisions on the terms on which 
1. THE OIL & GAS J., March 25, 1974, at 60. 
2. G.A. Res. 3171, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973). 
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it will take over foreign investors' property. There is another paragraph 
in here that picks up the citation that Mr. Griffin mentioned. It says 
that the developing countries should get together to improve conditions 
of access to markets, to coordinate production policies, and thus to 
guarantee the full exercise of sovereignty by developing countries .over . 
their natural resources. That is paragraph seven. 
This Resolution was adopted by the United Nations General As-
sembly by a vote of 108 to 1. The only government with the fortitude to 
vote against it was the United Kingdom. The United States joined with 
15 other countries in abstaining from the Resolution. What a hypocrisy 
world peace through law is when the United Nations General Assembly 
passes resolutions such as this. The Resolution may well be discussed 
at some length this afternoon, but I want to mention it here to show how 
ridiculous it is to assume that super-powers in the field of government-
industry relations go hand-in-hand with the size or financial resources 
of a corporation. 
To me, two things are abundantly clear. First, within its own bor-
ders, the smallest country has greater power than the largest business 
corporation in the world. Second, that power alone without resources 
does not produce economic miracles. Accordingly, developing countries 
are in sad need of greater maturity than they now have, as reflected by 
this Resolution, if they are to attract the capital so vital to their eco-
nomic development. This Resolution reflects a "help yourself' rather 
than a "self-help" attitude. It is disappointing, in this connection, to 
note that yesterday's New York Times said that 18 countries have 
pledged continuing aid to poorer nations, apparently without any regard 
whatever for their attitude as reflected in this Resolution. 
With this off my chest, I would like to turn for a minute to the topic 
of the day, which is foreign governmental controls of multinational cor-
porations marketing in the United States. If I had known that this was 
a petroleum seminar, I would have brought a few more statistics with 
me than I did. But Mr. Griffin apparently assumes that this is a petro-
leum seminar. 
States may, of course, assert territorial jurisdiction without regard 
to nationality and, with respect to their own citizens, may go further and 
assert jurisdiction over them wherever they may be. Also, in appropriate 
circumstances, territorial jurisdiction may be asserted on the basis of 
effects caused within a state by acts done outside the territory of the 
state. Application of these rules to their full extent will often bring the 
same matter within the jurisdiction of more than one state. In such 
cases, rules of comity should govern the decision as to which state has 
jurisdiction. 
In antitrust cases, Mr. Justice Holmes enunciated this sound prin-
ciple of comity back in the early years of the 20th century in the so-
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called Banana Case. 3 But later judges, including Judge Learned Hand 
in the Aluminum Case, 4 did what I regard as veering off the path by 
giving jurisdiction under the antitrust laws to overseas matters that 
more appropriately should have been left to foreign governments. On 
occasion, this has led to a foreign government flatly refusing to allow an 
American antitrust decree to be put into effect within its country. The 
Treasury Department also has on occasion gone too far in its attempt 
to apply the Trading With the Enemy Act to activities of U.S. compa-
nies or their affiliates in foreign countries conducted in full accord with 
the laws of those countries. 
What the United States has done, other governments could conceiv-
ably try to do. The sound approach is to look to the principles of comity 
to provide a sensible solution in each case; and that is about as far as 
one can go as a generalization. I would be glad to discuss any specific 
point. 
Now I have some notes on what Mr. Griffin said. First of all, his 
reference to the "Seven Sisters" is itself a pejorative word. It was coined 
by Enrico Mattei, who was the Chief Executive of the Italian State Oil 
Company prior to his death. It applied back to a time prior to the 1956 
Arab-Israeli War, when virtually all of the foreign production of oil was 
in the hands of seven companies, five American and two British. Since 
that time, company after company has gone into foreign exploration and 
the catchword no longer has any relevance at all. He also spoke of joint 
ventures and spoke especially to the production level. Now the joint 
ventures producing oil in the Middle East, which were worked out with 
the full approbation of the State Department and the Department of 
Justice, are specifically limited to production and to refining in the 
producing countries. The carry-over of joint activities to marketing, or 
to any activities beyond the boundaries of the countries in which the 
joint ventures operate, was specifically excluded. 
The statement that Aramco is a foreign subsidiary could be mis-
leading. Aramco is a U.S. corporation. It is operating in a foreign land, 
but it is a U.S. corporation, and the United States has the same full 
control over Aramco that it has over any other American corporation. 
When it comes to the Arab embargo on oil, the United States has never 
hesitated to apply and enforce its neutrality laws and the Trading With 
the Enemy Act to any corporation doing business in the United States 
with respect to exports from the United States. It seems perfectly clear 
to me that as a matter of international law, Saudi Arabia and other 
Middle East countries have comparable powers with respect to exports 
3. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909). 
4. United States v. Aluminum Corp. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
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from their countries. I think that is all the comment I want to make prior 
to the discussion period. 
DEAN BEACH: Thank you Mr. Finlay. It seems as if we may be 
starting to build up a very good fight before we are done here. 
Professor, I see you have the telltale legal pads, so I think you are 
entitled to equal time. 
PROF. GORDON: I would like to make a couple of comments about 
Mr. Griffin's statement. The word "multinational" is a rather difficult 
word. It is not an appropriate word. Any word which suggests a tie to a 
nation may be inappropriate for these companies. The companies would 
like to be able to eliminate any national ties; perhaps they would rather 
be referred to as omninational or even better, extranational. Indeed the 
chairman of Dow Chemical Company said a year ago "that he wished 
he could find an island somewhere where the company could locate and 
be beholden to no nation and to no man." I think that we have to start 
from a realistic base that multinational corporations are not very inter-
ested in directing their companies' activities to meet some national 
public goals; nor should they be. They are business corporations; they 
have primary obligations to make profits for their shareholders. The 
obligation of the government is to control all the corporations operating 
within their territory. I think governments spend a great deal of time 
hoping that multinational corporations will direct themselves to assume 
more socially responsible policies both in this country and abroad. I will 
comment on that more extensively this afternoon. 
Mr. Griffin emphasized production in terms of the oil companies, 
perhaps implying that distribution is not an area that is to have much 
of an effect on multinational corporations. That may not be true. Those 
persons in Mr. Finlay's former company with whom I am most familiar 
are associates with their Latin American operations. Some few years 
back I was told that in three or four years they expected their difficulties 
to be in production, and not in the distribution area. They expected to 
become more dominant in distribution than they were then. We are dis-
covering that national companies in this world are in countries becom-
ing involved in distribution as well as production. An example of this is 
Costa Rica which, as several Central American countries have done, has 
organized a national refinery buying crude from Venezuela, and then 
selling the refined oil to various foreign controlled distributors. Until a 
couple of years ago, the distribution in Costa Rica was performed by 
Exxon, Gulf, and Texaco. Then the government entered the distribution 
process, and there was a great deal of difficulty since the government 
wanted to set a low retail price. Obviously once the government set a 
low price for its own distribution, it placed pressure upon the other 
companies to sell at a price less than they believed profitable. The 
purchase of gas is an interesting process in Costa Rica where I lived as 
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a researcher at the University. You would fill your tank about half full 
with regular gas, which seemed about 65 octane. This allowed you, 
hopefully, to reach a Texaco station which sold gasoline for light air-
pianes, about 110 octane, with which you would fill the remainder of 
your car. Then it sloshed around while you were driving to a mixture 
roughly comparable to what your engine needed. 
Oil companies have long been attacking Mexico's oil production as 
being inefficient. The autos continue to run sputteringly, but they do 
run. The oil is theirs and that has become very important. It reminds 
me of a cartoon that appeared in Peru around the time of the IPC 
takeover. It showed a picture of an Exxon station and a peasant, with 
his arm around his little boy, saying, "Some day soon this will all be 
yours." This, of course, has come about. It illustrates the polarity of oil 
companies and the Third World. 
The legal effects which Mr. Griffin has commented upon lead me 
to question whether or not this is an appropriate time to break up oil 
companies, at a time when there may be a greater need for further 
allowing oil companies to combine to bargain with foreign governments. 
There are great dangers in the extra-territorial application of our anti-
trust laws, even though they are subject to the defenses Mr. Griffin 
mentioned. Such application is illustrated by a very interesting 1958 
consent decree in a Louisiana case dealing with the United Fruit Com-
pany. The United Fruit Company was ordered and agreed to divest itself 
of its distribution facilities in the United States, in addition to a sub-
stantial part of its infrastructure within Central American countries. 
Most interestingly, however, was its agreement to divest itself of nine 
million items of production. There was no input from any of the Central 
American nations on this. United Fruit was required to divest by spin-
ning off a separate company owned by the current shareholders; over a 
period of time new and different shareholders would come into each 
company. Alternatively, they could form an entirely new company for 
sale to a new group of shareholders. Nine million items of production 
amounts to a great deal. The company initially decided to give up the 
western production in Panama. When this was proposed to an earlier 
government of Panama, the government offered to buy it. The court 
refused to accept this, essentially saying "you must sell to private own-
ership and not to ownership by one of the nations." I think if we were 
to say that to Panama now, they would respond, "We own it as of now, 
or we have taken it over as of now, and now we will talk about possible 
compensation." The decree is interesting. I talked to an official of the 
company who. was about to retire. He was a dedicated and well known 
Latin Americanist. I asked him why he ever agreed to that. He said he 
had not agreed to it; it had been done by others. He said, "I think the 
reason we agreed was because the man who decided to go along with it 
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was about to retire, and he didn't have to live with it." He also said that 
it was a very hard consent decree to comply with. This raised several 
questions: whether we should be looking to our antitrust laws to resolve 
this type of problem, and whether or not we want to break up the oil 
companies at this time, at least whether or not we want to break up the 
oil companies in the fashion I am assuming that we are implying, as 
opposed to perhaps some other break-up of oil, such as attacking the 
vertical integration of the oil industry. 
The third area that Mr. Griffin discussed was his views of three 
actions of the Arabs: their embargo, their reduction in the amount of 
oil produced, and their increase in prices. I think we would like to know 
their reason for so acting. The purpose of this discussion seems to be to 
explore the effect on marketing in the United States by foreign govern-
mental control over multinational organizations. I do not think the 
Arabs have any interest at all in controlling the markets abroad. They 
are interested in obtaining currency from the sale of oil to fulfill their 
goals. One of those goals does affect the United States. It has to do with 
the U.S. political posture toward Israel and, indeed, the Arabs have 
been extremely successful in drawing Henry Kissinger into a pro-Arab 
dialogue. Secondly, they have been quite successful in partially spliting 
the U .S./European alliance. They have also had a very strong effect on 
world financial markets. What do the Arabs really want out of this? I 
think they want a different market system for oil in the world. They no 
longer want what we have long maintained as an oil market process. 
This is good business on their part and it is exactly what we should 
expect businessmen and nations to want to do. They no longer want a 
system based solely upon a flow of an exhaustible resource from the 
Arab countries in return for products produced in the capital exporting 
nations. They want some form of mutually agreed-upon, integrated sys-
tem of industrial and commercial cooperation extending beyond the 
realm of oil. I do not attempt to identify what the Arabs want in terms 
of development. They do not want to be like the United States. The 
heads of the Arab kingdoms are not interested in changing the form of 
hiring standards to that which exists in the United States. They would 
like to help other Arab countries in meeting some basic goals. I believe 
they will emphasize industrial diversification and utilize oil to develop 
oil-related products, in which case we will no longer be able to buy oil 
from the Arabs unless perhaps we also buy their petrochemical prod-
ucts. They undoubtedly have secondary aims which may deal with pro-
duction of commodities such as engines for ships, turbines, or perhaps 
automobile assembly. They may also wish to begin production of some 
form of selective defense products. They are simply interested in using 
a mutual resource in order to achieve their concepts of development. I 
will speak more about this in the afternoon in the following terms: Can 
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countries with other resources do this? What is the philosophy of the 
banana producing countries? What are the current developmental theo-
ries? How may they be achieved vis-a-vis the developed part of the 
world? 
DEAN BEACH: Everyone has had their introductory remarks. Let me 
ask a couple of questions. 
Are we talking about international law or international power? Is 
there a distinction? It seems to me that Mr. Griffin suggested that 
Aramco was an Arabian corporation organized under the laws of Saudi 
Arabia and I think I understood Mr. Finlay to say that it was an Ameri-
can corporation organized under the laws of the United States. Is it 
relevant to find out if there is an answer or is it, as I think Professor 
Gordon suggested, irrelevant to even think about? 
MR. GRIFFIN: I think it depends. I want to exercise my right to 
rebuttal or reply. 
MR. FINLAY: Well, you know perfectly well it is a U.S. corporation. 
If you have any question about it we can get that resolved by the outside 
counsel of Aramco. 
MR. YouNG: Aramco is a Delaware corporation, and it always has 
been. 
MR. GRIFFIN: I will admit an error-I based my statement on papers 
filed with the Church committee. I don't know if you are aware that 
there are papers with the Church committee. 
I have seen newspaper reports that it is an Arabian company. I have 
seen papers that say it is an Arabian corporation. I will admit error 
based on your comment. 
DEAN BEACH: Well, we cleared one thing up. 
MR. GRIFFIN: I would like to reply to another of Mr. Finlay's com-
ments concerning the directors of Aramco. The point I was trying to 
make was that the directors don't run Aramco or did not run Aramco. 
The group that did run Aramco before 1972 was the executive committee 
that met in New York. I think that Mr. Finlay is making the classic 
statement of "yes, the directors run a corporation-why shouldn't they 
and why shouldn't the majority of the owners out-vote the minority 
owners." That is all perfectly correct, but the point I was trying to make 
was that the composition of the board of directors of Aramco didn't 
make any difference because it was run by this executive committee. 
The executive committee didn't have any Arabians on it, just represent-
atives of the four owners. Now, that situation has changed only because 
the Arabs have forced it to change. I raised the point to demonstrate the 
effect this Arab participation had on the running of these American 
owned companies. 
MR. FINLAY: That is a generalization like Professor Gordon's gene-
ralization that all corporations want to be above any law. That is abso-
9
Beach et al.: Panel Discussion: Foreign Governmental Control of Multinational C
Published by SURFACE, 1974
1974] Panel Discussion 199 
lutely ridiculous. Practically every corporate executive in the world 
recognizes that he is subject to the laws of the nation in which his cor-
poration is incorporated and subject also to the laws of every nation in 
which he does business with respect to his activities in that country. 
Now maybe he doesn't like some of the things they do, but to suggest 
that corporations want to be a law unto themselves is a generalization 
without substance. 
Practically every organization has an executive committee; a chari-
table organization, a vestry of churches and universities. That is just a 
way of trying to get material to put before a board of directors and to 
function between directors' meetings. Now, a board of directors can 
always overrule an executive committee and that is true of the Aramco 
board as of any other board. But ordinarily, the views of the executive 
committee will be accepted by the board. Now the minute the executive 
committee of Aramco decides something without the Saudi Arabian 
directors being in on it, and if it is totally contrary to their views, you 
can rest assured they will take it up at a board meeting. If they don't 
take it up, it is because the executive committee has anticipated their 
concern and has tried to achieve some kind of balance. 
MR. GRIFFIN: I think that either I have failed to make my point 
clearly, or that we have reached a point of irreconcilable differences. The 
point I am trying to make is based on published interviews with Sheik 
Yamani. When he was asked, "Why do you people demand participa-
tion and what did you have to gain besides the buy-back provisions," 
he said, "Look, I was sitting there on the board of directors of Aramco, 
and people would walk in and say, 'Here is what New York decided.' I 
said, 'Do you want to take a vote on it?' They would say, 'yes.' The vote 
would be 4 to 1 against me." He said, "In 90 percent of the cases I agreed 
with what they wanted to do. But I was angry that nobody bothered to 
consult me even though we were the country that owned the oil." He 
was saying "we have decided that the only way we could exercise sover-
eignty-" (I don't think the term "sovereignty" is appropriate here, but 
that is the word he used) "the only way we could exercise our sovereignty 
over the oil we owned in the ground was to get on the executive commit-
tee. We wanted to be consulted beforehand, we didn't want to be pre-
sented with a fait accompli and just verify it."5 I think that is his point. 
I think Mr. Finlay is talking about the technical operations of the com-
panies and what are the proper legal standards. I agree with everything 
he is saying. What I am trying to say is that the Arabs felt they were 
getting the short end of the stick in policy. In fairness they demanded 
participation. 
MR. FINLAY: Well, if you want to go down the road of socialization, 
that is correct. 
5. Quoted in Mosley, The Richest Oil Company in the World, N.Y. Times, March 
10, 1974, § 6 (Magazine), at 30. 
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MR. GRIFFIN: I think Mr. Young is going to jump on me. 
MR. YouNG: No, may I comment Mr. Chairman? Aramco is my 
c~ient and I have no authority to speak for it in this connection. What I 
say is entirely my own responsibility. I think on this particular point the 
discussion is in some sense irrelevant. It is quite true that you have the 
sordid situation on the Aramco board, just because of the distribution 
of ownership. I am speaking primarily on the period before the govern-
ment became the stockholder. The center of gravity was between the 
company on the one hand and the Saudi Arabian government on the 
other. Negotiations between those two on the original 50/50 deal on 
royalties and income tax were worked out. Every time the government 
sought an increase in pay it was worked out in those negotiations. It 
wasn't a question of what went on inside. It was more a question of the 
company dealings with the government and the positions which the 
company took were not satisfactory to the government, whether or not 
the government directors were outvoted. Company representatives will 
very shortly find themselves trying to explain what they were doing, and 
why the government should not insist on a different arrangement. Do I 
make the point here? 
MR. GRIFFIN: I agree with what you say. 
MR. YouNG: I think Sheik Yamani's point about "we could get 
nothing out of the company until we got on the board and the executive 
committee" is in a sense true, but it never affected the ultimate results. 
Perhaps it will make it a little easier to move things along from this 
point. 
MR. GRIFFIN: I would agree and I also think I would agree with your 
first statement. Maybe we are off on a tangent that is not all that 
relevant. 
DEAN BEACH: I would like to learn something here. Now is it correct 
that who runs Aramco and what committee and to what extent are all 
answered by the sufferance of the Arabian government? 
MR. GRIFFIN: I am not sure of what you are asking. It depends on 
the context. We have to step back a minute. I was talking in the context 
of most of the cases that exist in the terms of the extra-territorial appli-
cation of our antitrust laws. That is where most of these cases on juris-
diction and defenses come in. I think Professor Gordon raised an excel-
lent point by saying, "Well, don't we have to ask a first question by 
saying, 'Do we want to apply antitrust laws in the context of oil?'" I 
think the question is, "Is who really runs Aramco important?" Well, it 
depends again upon what you want to do. If we have a legal suit brought 
under the U.S. antitrust laws, Aramco's defense would be, or more 
appropriately its American parent's defense would be: "Look, it is a 
combination of sovereign compulsion and sovereign immunity." They 
would argue, "We admit we didn't sell you any oil during those months, 
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but that was not our fault. The Arab governments ordered us to do it; 
we had to do it." It is exactly what Texaco argued in the Interamerican 
Refinin{?6 case and I believe that the oil companies probably have a very 
valid defense under this precedent. The question I was trying to raise 
by pointing that case out is, assuming that Interamerican is in accord 
with existing precedents, is it a good policy? Do we want to change the 
law on sovereign compulsion? 
MR. FINLAY: I think you have to focus on specifics here. There are 
some things that are clearly within the government's national interest 
and there are other things which are within the sphere of corporate 
activities. Now when it comes to questions as to delivering oil to Israel, 
or even more recently, delivering oil to the United States or to the 
Netherlands, I believe that I am correct in saying that there is nothing 
in the concession agreements about that. A government can decide for 
itself the countries with which it will trade . If it flatly says, "You may 
not deliver oil to Israel, you may not deliver to the United States," the 
oil company has the option between complying or being in violation. 
The result of being in violation in most of these countries would be 
expropriation, and in the United States the result of a comparable viola-
tion of our law would be criminal prosecution. But in either case, you 
have got the force of governmental policy with which you must comply. 
Now, when you get to such questions as the prices at which you will sell, 
the concession agreements do not say anything about sales prices but 
they do say something about how the governments' royalties and income 
taxes are calculated and they have what they call the tax reference price 
for such purposes. In the course of the difficulty over the Middle East 
situation, the governments took the decision out of the hands of the 
companies and just said arbitrarily that the tax reference price is so and 
so, something like $11.65 a barrel for regular crude today. It used to be 
those things were negotiated, but in this confrontation situation the 
governments just declared what it will be. 
PROF. GORDON: Mr. Finlay mentioned that the companies would be 
required to either ship or not ship oil to wherever the government would 
require them. A parallel situation occurred in Cuba. In 1959 the oil 
companies were expropriated in Cuba after they refused to refine Soviet 
oil at Castro's demand. Their arguments were two-fold. One was that 
the government can't tell us, as a private business, whose oil we could 
refine. 
MR. FINLAY: The companies were expropriated as a result-that is 
what I said. 
PROF. GORDON: The second argument was that they couldn't refine 
6. Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. 
Del. 1970) . 
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it because of the higher sulphur content in the Soviet oil. The inability 
to refine this oil proved to be incorrect. The. oil apparently was refine-
able. The oil companies are recognizing the limitations of their power. 
I don't think it makes a great deal of difference who owns the oil 
production facilities. What we are concerned with is what should the 
relationship of the oil companies be with the foreign government? It is 
interesting that the comment in The Oil and Gas Journal states that 
Mobil "accepts 51 % participation by Libya." It did not have any choice 
here at all. It was very nice of Mobil to accept a joint venture, where 
the alternative was to give up 100 percent. 
MR. FINLAY: They had a concession agreement that did not give the 
Libyan government any share of ownership, so what they did was to 
accept the unilateral modification of the concession agreement. They 
did it under the pressure of total nationalization. 
DEAN BEACH: May I point out that we have in our audience Dr. 
Omar Ghobashy. He will be on the panel this afternoon, but I think we 
could implead him into this litigation that is developing here, perhaps 
as a proper party, or maybe as an indispensable party. 
DR. GHOBASHY: This is a very interesting discussion. I appreciate 
your asking me to join. The point I have to make concerns the last 
comment in your statement that there was unilateral action on the part 
of the government of Libya; or was there multilateral action taken by 
the oil companies and the oil producing governments. I think that these 
actions have been done with mutual consent and these countries have 
at least the adequate funds available to pay for compensation. We know 
in the past that we talked about nationalization in Mexico and other 
countries which did not have the funds to pay for prompt, adequate, and 
effective compensation. These oil producing countries are in a position 
to do so. I think that Mr. Young and some of the people who deal with 
the oil companies realize that it is not really a question of nationaliza-
tion but a question of participation. They are now content with the fact 
that this eventually will happen and it is a question of time and value 
and the amount of the book value of the oil that is actually in the 
countries that control the oil. So it is not really a question of nationaliza-
tion or compensation but a question of value. In a matter of years the 
oil producing countries will reach an agreement with the oil companies 
as to the question of 100 percent participation. It is not even a question 
of 51 percent control, it is a question of full participation which more or 
less amounts to some kind of nationalization of production. The oil 
companies will eventually be the distributors, and they will be content. 
As someone already mentioned, the oil companies are not really inter-
ested in marketing, although there has been some statements as to some 
countries, such as Iran, which at one time or another, has participated 
in marketing. Few have stated that they are more interested in owning 
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gas stations or more interested in chemicals and petrochemical by-
products of oil. The arguments are openly stated that the unilateral 
actions by the governments concerned are not necessarily correct. I 
think that the oil companies are realizing this fact and are moving into 
the area of negotiation. I would say that there is always a threat from 
the oil producing countries. People forget, however, that the oil compa-
nies have a certain amount of pressure. The governments of these com-
panies, particularly the United States and Great Britain, also apply a 
degree of pressure, political, economic and otherwise. Therefore, there 
is mutual pressure from both sides. So when we say that Libya has 
threatened to expropriate, it really is not a very serious threat because 
the companies realize that they will be nationalized and they are work-
ing toward that extent. On the other hand, the United States may exert 
pressure if the oil company seeks that pressure in the form of politics, 
economics and so forth. We have seen mounting pressure by the United 
States to effectuate internal changes with the Soviet Union before ex-
panding East-West trade. Technological and economic aid may be used 
as an incentive to cause a change in policy. The pressure is mutual. I 
think that when the oil companies invested in these countries, these 
countries had no choice but to accept those concessions. The oil compa-
nies have the know-how, the technology, the resources, the capital and 
so forth. Once the oil is discovered and produced and huge profits are 
acquired, demands are made to change the original concessions which 
were not fair when originally made. Now they are to be revised to arrive 
at a reasonable present-day market value. The days of cheap labor in 
the oil countries and low concession terms have passed. Now these coun-
tries want more compensation. But they must also take into considera-
tion that the industrial supplies that they buy from the industrial coun-
tries are expensive. They have to maintain a balance between the value 
of oil production, the value of the raw material, and the value of manu-
factured products. This does not only apply to oil, but it applies to all 
natural resources. What these countries are asking for is value for their 
products equal to what they pay when they exchange it for industrial 
products, and it also takes into consideration what they pay for the 
technicians that work in these countries, inflation and devaluation of 
foreign currencies. 
DEAN BEACH: Gentlemen, and particularly the two on my right, we 
hear now that the recent participation agreements have been bargained 
and mutually agreed upon. 
MR. FINLAY: This is the article from The Oil and Gas Journal. 
According to the article, Mobil Oil Ltd. has been operating under pro-
test against Libya's 51 percent nationalization decree of September 1, 
1973, but says that: 
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. now it is ready to bow to Libya's terms. The company has notified 
the Libyan Government that it is willing to continue operations under 
the provisions of the law and 'to enter a participation agreement with 
the government and national oil corporation' .7 
Now when that agreement is signed it will be by agreement. But in 
the meantime, the article says that "[tJhe Libyan Government has 
since last September exercised effective control of 51 % of Mobil's crude 
output," thus putting its nationalization law into effect pending the 
agreement. Continuing, the article states that "[e]arlier this year, the 
Libyan Government announced 100% nationalization of three holdouts 
on the 51 % nationalization law-units of Texaco, Inc., Standard Oil Co. 
of California, and Atlantic Richfield." So it is quite correct that these 
things are resblved by agreement. In the background of the negotiations, 
however, there is always the threat of nationalization. It is a question 
of the delicate balance between the companies on the one hand, and the 
governments on the other. Government attitudes of what is fair are 
radically different after oil is found than they were before it is found. 
The oil resources of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have been 
abundant over the years. There have been several substantial improve-
ments in the government's position under successive modifications of 
the original concessions. Some of the new countries that don't have 
anything, in order to attract capital, have consciously and deliberately 
agreed to concession agreements with terms less favorable to the govern-
ment than those prevailing in countries where vast crude resources have 
been found. Whenever these newer countries find oil, however, what was 
fair at the time the agreement was signed is re-examined in light of the 
discoveries and the concessionaires are pressured for a change in their 
concessions. It happened in Nigeria and in Ecuador, and it is happening 
in other countries. It is like a changing ball game, and the oil companies 
have accepted the facts of life and have found it possible to adjust to 
them. Certainly, you cannot suggest that the oil companies are free to 
ignore something like the boycott of the United States. I am sure that 
you will agree with me that if the oil companies had ignored the boycott 
of the United States and of the Netherlands in the recent Middle East 
situation, there would have been some radical measures taken against 
them. 
DR. GHOBASHY: Yes, I agree with you, with the exception that 
Saudi Arabia would not have gone to that extent, although I think some 
other countries would have. I am almost sure Libya would definitely 
have gone all the way. There would have been some drastic steps, but I 
don't think Saudi Arabia would have totally nationalized the oil. They 
don't have the technicians to run it and they don't have the strong 
7. TttEOIL.&GAsJ., March25, 1974, at60. 
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backing to confront the United States at this time. I don't think they 
wanted a complete confrontation. I wouldn't place all the blame on the 
oil companies. I think they had reasons to fear damages to their indus-
tries and they had to take actions to obey the decisions of the oil pro-
ducing countries. On the other hand, there could have been curtailment 
of production and other actions which could have been damaging. They 
could have problems in the renegotiation of the concession agreement 
because there could have been immediate demands by Saudi Arabia on 
immediate participation. But, I doubt very much that King Faisal 
would have moved in a drastic way, like the nationalization of the Suez 
Canal by President Nassar. He prefers to achieve his goals slowly with 
some moderation. But I agree with you fully that the oil companies have 
no choice but to obey the orders. On the other hand, in addition to the 
decision of the Saudi Arabian government, we are always forgetting that 
the decision of this government was not independent. It was a combined 
decision by the entire Arab oil producing countries and non-producing 
Arab countries. It is also of significance that non-oil producing countries 
have great influence on the oil producing countries and vice-versa. 
There is a combined effort of the oil producing countries with the highly 
organized Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. You noticed 
the lifting of the embargo was not taken by Saudi Arabia alone; it was 
a decision made by all Arab nations. You will recall the original meeting 
on that matter was to be held in Cairo and it was shifted to Libya and 
so forth. Libya held out. The decision of one of these countries was 
affected not only by the oil producing countries, but also by the non-oil 
producing countries, some of which were non-Arab, such as Nigeria, 
Indonesia and Iran and the other petroleum producing countries, who 
influence the decision on the price of oil. 
DEAN BEACH: You know it may be in the international field as well 
as elsewhere, that the best possible bargain or contract is one where 
everybody feels he has been thoroughly abused. 
Professor Gordon you have been biting your tongue for some time. 
PROF. GORDON: I know of no instance where a large foreign corpora-
tion has gone to the government, knocked on the door, and said, "Could 
we sit down and talk about turning over some of our corporation to your 
government?" In that respect, at least, the inception of discussions was 
unilateral. Indeed it goes further; the hydrocarbon reversion law of Ven-
ezuela which I guess was passed-
DEAN BEACH: Let me interrupt. It may well be, in light of what Mr. 
Griffin suggested as a defense, that you will have some companies 
knocking on the door and getting a part ownership for their participa-
tion. That seems to be a pretty good shield to an antitrust action. 
PROF. GORDON: Indeed, this is the way more companies should be 
thinking of operating. The hydrocarbon reversion law of Venezuela was 
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a unilateral decree indicating that at the end of the concessions in 1983 
the properties must be left in a particular condition. It was quite shock-
ing to the companies. Indeed, I think that most of the companies would 
like to think that as of the magic hour when their concession expired, 
they would all walk out the gate, turn the key and as they left the 
premises, the depreciation of their properties would be completed, the 
remaining equipment would be worthless, having been totally consumed 
in productive use. 
DEAN BEACH: So after 1983 comes 1984. 
PROF. GORDON: I don't think we are going to reach 1983 because the 
oil properties are likely to be taken over before then. It is a serious 
political problem. I think they are asking for too much. But I would 
respond along the lines of Dr. Ghobashy, when he said that present 
contracts are often unfair. Many of the concession agreements entered 
into years ago were so lopsided because the foreign companies were able 
to say, "Take it or leave it." It is like buying a car. You sign a loan 
agreement with a bank without being able to negotiate its terms. If you 
do not want the loan on their terms, that is fine, go elsewhere. But the 
other bank has the same kind of agreement. So these contracts, in a 
sense, have an adhesive quality, and consequently it would be interest-
ing to see what would happen with that kind of concession contract in 
an international court. Should a contract designated as adhesive give 
the weaker party the right to renegotiate? 
It is nevertheless wrong to say that all concession contracts are 
adhesive. The foreign companies have brought a great deal of develop-
ment to Latin American countries. Central America would have few 
roads, railroads, and port facilities today, and the standard of living 
would be much worse, were it not for the United Fruit Company. Yet 
United Fruit has been castigated greatly in Central America for its 
dominance and for its control, in many instances, over host govern-
ments. 
We are facing a surge of nationalism in the developing areas which 
is not going to go away. If anything, it is going to be more severe. We 
have got to learn better ways of dealing with nationalism, better preven-
tive care. Highly qualified people at Exxon put together a file on the 
legal analysis of the IPC issue, and with the exception of a few flaws in 
the land titles, it is an extremely well presented legal argument. It 
overlooks one basic thing-that is the desire of the people, in dew~loping 
areas, to control the production of basic commodities. We can't con-
demn corporations for acting like corporations. As a shareholder of a 
corporation, I would be concerned if representatives of my company 
went to a Third World government and said, "Let's all sit down, we 
would like you to have a greater share in our profits." Now I wouldn't 
be concerned with what has been suggested by our moderator. Perhaps 
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this is what should be done. Indeed, I think it is tragic that the negotia-
tions enforced upon the copper companies by President Frei of Chile did 
not have an opportunity to come to a natural result. The negotiations 
led to an assumption of ownership by Chile of 51 percent of the copper 
companies with very substantial technical assistance, and a right of the 
government to assume an even greater interest in the copper production. 
It did not have a chance to work out according to the agreement. The 
nationalistic pressures were sufficient enough and the tragedies which 
took place under the Allende government led to a total takeover of those 
companies. Chile would be far better off if that had not happened. 
MR. HAIGHT: It seems to me we have a dilemma here. We want to 
work out some system of bringing the capital into the developing coun-
tries so that they can develop along the lines that they would like. At 
the same time we need to protect the capital that goes into the country 
to provide what the government wants. There are certain basics. First 
of all, it is generally clear from what has been said that the effective 
power within a country lies with the government. When a company goes 
in to work out a deal and they embody the deal in a contract, as was 
recently done in Ecuador, the government has the power whenever it 
wishes to change it. If there is a negotiation over change, the dealing is 
completely unilateral because if the company does not agree with what 
the government wants to do, the latter simply takes over. What we need 
to do is to find a way of balancing the interest of a government in 
regulating its own economy with the interest of the private party in 
having a stable legal regime in which it can operate. 
There are perhaps two ways of doing this. One is to agree on a 
method of settling disputes or even a technique for renegotiation. That 
would at least be better than leaving it all in the hands of the govern-
ment. The other is to follow along the lines of the French administrative 
contract. Such a contract provides that the government can make 
changes, but whenever the private party or the other party is prejudiced 
in any way, he is entitled to compensation. Perhaps we are moving in 
that direction in research development contracts. But at the same time 
I think we all must recognize that the present situation is one of com-
plete anarchy. The only people that seem to benefit are the governments 
of the developing countires. The question is how long they will benefit 
from this way of "doing business" with the developed world. One would 
hope that there would be some form of accommodation which would 
permit private capital to come in and operate on reasonable terms. 
Mr. Griffin referred to the defenses available to an American com-
pany vis-a-vis its own government, where it is compelled to do some-
thing in another country in which it operates. Suppose the general situa-
tion was reversed and we were dealing with a foreign company here 
which was prohibited by any law from selling to Peking or to North 
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Korea. It would certainly be considered outrageous behavior for any 
foreign company in this country to do this contrary to the order of the 
U.S. Government. Such prohibitions should be recognized by the gov-
ernment of the parent company. The defense of sovereign compulsion 
is reasonable and in line with our own ideas of due process. 
Mr. Griffin cited the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company case in the Pro-
ceedings before the Grand Jury in 1952 as a case of sovereign immunity. 
It was actually not such a case, although the court released Anglo-
Iranian on that ground. Anglo-Iranian never asked for sovereign immun-
ity. What they said was: "We have an order from the Minister in London 
which prohibits us from producing documents outside the United 
States." The judge did not know what to do with this. Very much 
impressed by the document with a great big seal on it, and with the fact 
that 51 or 52 percent of it was owned by the British government, he 
concluded that he was dealing with an arm of the British government. 
So, he let them out. But actually that was a case of sovereign compul-
sion. 
There are many other cases. In the Swiss Watchmakers case, Judge 
Cashion said that he could not punish the companies for doing some-
thing that the Swiss government ordered them to do in Switzerland. He 
decided against the companies in that case because he said the Swiss 
government had not ordered them. The government had merely ap-
proved their conduct without actually giving them an order. 
DEAN BEACH: Thank you, Mr. Haight. I have a promise over here. 
But before I get to that, let me say that my ears are bothering me again. 
I think Mr. Griffin, you suggested that 35 percent was sufficient to 
trigger the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 
MR. GRIFFIN: I don't think it is relevant. I think Mr. Haight makes 
a good point. The case here says 35 percent, but I don't think it makes 
any difference. 
MR. FINLAY: Thirty-five percent is clearly incorrect. 
MR. GRIFFIN: I have the case report here, and it says 35 percent, but 
the court could have been wrong when it wrote the opinion. 8 
MR. HAIGHT: They have more than 50 percent. 
DEAN BEACH: Do you think it would have been different at 35 per-
cent? Although you said it was not really the ground of the decision 
anyway, suppose it had been 35 percent. 
MR. HAIGHT: No, I don't think 35 percent would give them sovereign 
immunity. 
MR. GRIFFIN: Even though the court used the language that Anglo-
Iranian was an instrumentality of and indistinguishable from the British 
government?9 
8. In re Investigation of World Arrangements, 13 F.R.D. 280, 288, 290 (D.D.C. 1952). 
9. Id. at 290-91. 
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MR. HAIGHT: It is not in fact an instrumentality. The British 
government plays absolutely no role in the operation of the company. 
They are about as indepedent as Exxon. But the government owns the 
stock and has two directors on the board. They attend board meetings, 
but are not active in the business. No, it certainly is not an instrumen-
tality of the British government. 
DEAN BEACH: Mr. Finlay, I promised that you might say something. 
MR. FINLAY: I want to say something about Professor Gordon's refer-
ence to contracts of adhesion. I am not sure what that means. I guess it 
is when some poor devil has no power except to take what is thrust upon 
him. Is that the general implication of the term? 
PROF. GORDON: Partially. 
MR. FINLAY: Now, I wanted to say that that is totally passe in the 
oil industry. For more than 20 years Petroleum Intelligence Weekly and 
Platts Oilgram International have been publicizing the terms of every 
oil company agreement made with every country all over the world. 
There are special services that publish the terms of every concession 
agreement. Every significant oil country has officials who get these 
things, and they know precisely what is going on, so that they will know 
how to negotiate . Now, way back in the early days of the international 
oil business, it is conceivable that Ecuador would have been forced to 
deal with a single company. But at the time they made the agreements 
with Texaco and whatever other company it was, there were hundreds 
of people interested in new concessions around the world. The papers 
are just full of stories about small companies that had never been heard 
of before that now have concessions either alone or with others in the 
North Sea, the Persian Gulf, the South China Sea and many other parts 
of the world. Governments have complete information about what other 
countries have obtained in the way of agreements and they have interna-
tional consultants to assist them. These consultants go out to draft the 
petroleum laws. When Malayasia and Thailand became interested in 
granting concessions, the very first thing they did was get themselves 
an international consultant to help them set up a modern oil law that 
would protect their interests. And then when they come to negotiating 
a concession, they can do the same thing. So the idea that these con-
tracts are contracts of adhesion, I really don't think can be supported 
by the facts. The point is that you have a very precipitous Andean 
terrain in Ecuador. The prospective areas were on the Atlantic side of 
the Continental Divide, with perfectly horrendous costs for getting the 
oil out if and when it was found, so the Ecuadorian government made 
the best deal it could make in the absence of proven reserves sufficient 
to support a huge investment. When the reserves came along, they said, 
"Let us have another look at this." And that is when the renegotiations 
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started. Now, as far as I am concerned, if you were dealing with fellow 
Americans, you would hold their feet to the fire. There are all sorts of 
experimental ventures here. The fellow who sold the Xerox patent would 
probably want a better deal today than the one he probably got when 
he sold it to the Haloid Corporation which later became the Xerox 
Corporation, but that is just too bad. He made a deal in light of the 
circumstances at the time he made it. I think you have to consider that. 
I don't think that in legal discussions you should use generalities with-
out looking at the total facts and effect of the agreements. 
DEAN BEACH: There have been a couple of hands up in the audience. 
MR. SNOOK: I think both Mr. Finlay and Mr. Griffin use the terms 
"control" and "run" interchangeably. I would think that there would be 
a distinction in that by "control" it means that the oil producing coun-
tries want control. But in the end, the oil industry is still going to run 
everything. As Dr. Ghobashy said, Saudi Arabia probably wouldn't na-
tionalize because they didn't have the technicians. I am just wondering, 
in all the discussion about taking over control, the only thing it seems 
to me that the oil companies are losing are their anticipated profits, and 
they are losing a large cut of the pie, but they will still be running the 
industry. And with the technology, I am not sure about this, but I think 
that Hunt Tods Company makes most of the drill bits in the world. 
What I would like to know is whether the oil producing countries run 
the whole show by themselves? Aren't the multinational companies an 
indispensable party? 
DEAN BEACH: I am glad we got a question that could be answered 
yes or no. Anybody want to attempt that? 
MR. GRIFFIN: Well, I might say, first of all, that when I was talking 
about control, I was speaking in the context of American law and extra-
territoriality. Control becomes a very important aspect of parent-
subsidiary relationships, especially in "lifting the veil" cases. Courts 
rarely do a careful analysis of the facts. In most cases they merely speak 
of "control" and similar labels. 10 That was the context in which I spoke 
of "control," i.e., the legal criteria for when two legal entities will be 
held to be a single entity because the same people control both. I think 
you are using control in a much broader sense. You ask, "Can the Arab 
states run the oil industry themselves?" I think the answer is clearly no. 
I think also, it has already been said here today, that they really are not 
interested in doing that. I think we have to ask a more basic question. 
So far today we have skirted the issue, but no one has actually come out 
10. See Griffin, The Power of Host Countries Over the Multinational: Lifting the Veil 
in the European Economic Community and the United States , 6 L. & PoL. INT'L Bus. 375 
(1974). 
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and made a statement on the issue of, "Have the Arab countries done 
anything that violates international law?" Yes or no. Check box 1 or 2. 
MR. HAIGHT: They have refused to abide by contracts with foreign 
nationals. 
MR. GRIFFIN: That is what we ought to be talking about. In other 
words, specifically, what have the Arab countries done that we as the 
United States, or we as American international lawyers are upset about? 
After we answer that question we can go back to renegotiating pricing 
and concession agreements. Are we complaining because we don't like 
the Arab policy? It is not the way we like to see things done. Or are we 
complaining as international lawyers because these Arabs have clearly 
violated existing standards of international law as Mr. Haight argues, 
and I tend to agree. Perhaps we are crossing over into the afternoon 
discussion panel on expropriation. 
MR. HAIGHT: I thought from your talk we were talking along the 
lines of the Church committee which is exploring what should be the 
new pattern of relationships. According to that committee, the old pat-
tern is no longer satisfactory. Therefore, we should think of something 
else. As far as international law is concerned, the position is quite clear. 
The principles are established. All you have to do is to read the 
Restatement. The realities of the situation are, however, that govern-
ments are not obeying international law. They are repudiating interna-
tional law, as Mr. Finlay said. In the General Assembly of the United 
Nations, they are now working on a charter of economic rights and 
duties of states in which they are endeavoring to establish the principle 
that every country can expropriate property within its jurisdiction and 
determine itself what compensation should be. This is a new ball game. 
Whether there is any international law left in this area is difficult to say. 
Governments will not agree to go to the World Court and have the 
International Court of Justice decide these issues. There is no means of 
adjudication outside the expropriating countries. As the world needs oil 
and as these countries have the oil, it is just a clash of power. The oil 
companies are in the middle. What can the oil companies do in this 
area? It has been said that they have the technology and therefore they 
are indispensable. But anybody can go out and buy the technology. The 
problem is one of management. If you look at Petroleos Mexicanos in 
Mexico, they have got the oil, they have got the technology, they have 
got the people. They just don't know how to run it. Perhaps I shouldn't 
say that because they are running it the way they want to run it. But it 
may not be the most efficient way. 
PROF. GORDON: But it is theirs, and that is a very important thing 
in Mexico. 
MR. YouNG: I only have one minor comment. But I might say first 
that I agree almost entirely with what Mr. Haight has just said. I think, 
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for example, that there is a clear violation of international law in Libya, 
over the Libyan concessions. Now, where new arrangements have been 
negotiated, there may be more doubt as to whether there has been any 
such violation, unless you want to argue the issue of duress. And we 
would be here all weekend if we got into that. I will make one further 
comment on this business of the contract of adhesion. If you are going 
to use that argument today, I think it would probably run in favor of 
the companies. For example, In Libya, the contracts under which the 
companies operated were based on a form attached to the Libyan petro-
leum law. It was the government that dictated the contract, not the 
company. 
DEAN BEACH: I am feeling my responsibilities as moderator to be 
very heavy here because I realize cutting anybody off might well cut-off 
an insight that might solve all of the world's problems. In that context, 
we will take a few more remarks. 
PROF. GORDON: I think the comments by Mr. Haight with regard to 
Mexico need to be responded to. As I began saying, we should note that 
the Mexicans are generally content with the way the oil companies are 
operating. They are willing to have a less efficiently operated company; 
it is clearly less efficiently operated than it would be if it were operated 
by one of the American companies. The gas is not good, but the cars do 
run. I think that is very important. What does bother me is to see two 
of our distinguished practitioners say that there is a clear international 
law involving this area because it is in the Restatement. Congress en-
acted the Gonzalez Amendment and the Hickenlooper Amendment, and 
assumed that there is a certain international law. But there is no real 
agreement throughout the world. Maybe there was an international law 
at one time. If there was, it was developed by the capital-exporting 
countries without any input by the capital-importing countries. We 
have not been able to get together and determine what international law 
should be. I think clearly there is a right to take property. It does bother 
me that when there is a government grant of a concession there is often 
a unilateral change of that grant. Of course it is a different government 
that changes the grant in most cases. It was a different government in 
Cuba that took over the property, a different government in Peru, a 
different government in Guatemala in 1954 that took over United Fruit. 
What we generally recognize though, is that there is a right to take 
property in this country. It is provided for in the Constitution. But we 
have always recognized that there must be a right to compensation. And 
we consider that a right to prompt, adequate, and effective compensa-
tion. But we have not yet resolved what prompt, adequate, and effective 
means. In the context of a developing country, they cannot pay cash 
immediately. We have to talk in terms of long-term bonds in order to 
be realistic at all. But what is most troublesome is the view that there 
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is no right to compensation. This seems to be a view of many of the 
countries in the United Nations. This view is simply unrealistic. Com-
panies will not go into a nation and invest if there is no way of protecting 
their property, or they will invest in ways which are undesirable. One 
of those ways is to get in and out quickly. I think it is tragic that a 
company be forced to take the view that we have to get in with a 
minimum contact and · get as much profit out as quickly as possible 
before they are taken over. I think we have to resolve the problem and 
come up with an international law that has some realistic way of solving 
the compensation issue. But to say that it is there already, because it is 
in the Restatement, or because it is in the Hickenlooper Amendment, I 
think is wrong. 
MR. HAIGHT: I should not have referred to the Restatement. I think 
that the fact that it is in the Restatement does not make it international 
law. Of course not. The Restatement is merely an attempt to restate 
what international law is, and to that extent it is of some utility. The 
international law on this subject has been developed over a period of 
time, as you know. It is based on a series of adjudications, the wide-
spread acceptance of certain principles of international law, such as the 
right of a government to protect its own citizens in the territory of 
another state. It is true that we are going through a great revolution in 
international law. All you have to do is read the debates in the General 
Assembly and the Resolutions to which we have been referred. It is 
certainly to be considered whether, if there is to be a change, what the 
change should be. But, I think that whatever the developing countries 
may say, in speeches from time to time, or in official pronouncements, 
basically there is law today. That is evidenced by the vast network of 
treaties. I am sorry I didn't bring up a collection of these treaties that 
is available in booklet form. They are treaties with developing countries; 
and not merely the old friendship treaties with the United States, but 
treaties made in the last few years by Germany, Switzerland, France, 
Netherlands, United Kingdom, Italy; and among developing countries 
themselves there are treaties-such as between Kuwait and Iraq, an old 
treaty between Cuba and Japan, and between Japan and Costa Rica. 
There are many treaties that recognize the right of a government to 
protect its own citizens in the territory of another state and the princi-
ples of protection of alien property and the payment of compensation if 
it is expropriated. Those are the three essentials. Now, maybe it has to 
be changed. But I don't see any way of getting a flow of private capital 
into developing countries unless there are some basic principles that are 
accepted. 
DEAN BEACH: Let us give everybody on the panel one minute, waiva-
ble, but maximum one minute, to sum up and then we can break for 
lunch. 
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PROF. GORDON: I will just sum up with a comment by De Tocque-
ville saying that "Nations are like men, they love that which flatters 
their passions, even more than that which serves their interests." We 
have seen divergent views here this morning, and I wish that we could 
focus more upon those areas which serve interests as opposed to those 
which flatter passions. 
MR. FINLAY: I would like to go along with the point that Mr. Haight 
just made. The developing nations will never achieve their goals of an 
improved standard of living for their own citizens unless they get mas-
sive influxes of capital into their countries. Inter-governmental aid can-
not fill the bill and private capital is the alternative. And that won't fill 
the bill unless they provide a milieu of reasonable assurance that the 
investors can get a fair return on their money. This is the whole basis 
of private investment. I think that until such time as the developing 
countries generally recognize this point and work together with the in-
dustrial countries for some reasonable protection of private investment, 
they will continue to flounder as India and many others are floundering 
today. 
MR. GRIFFIN: I will end on an optimistic note. I think we have had 
a lot of down-beat discussion on how bad things are, and how they are 
going to get worse. I think we may be overestimating this whole issue, 
mainly because we all sat in cars in lines at gas stations. I think there 
is a danger in exaggerating the power of the multinational company as 
it faces national sovereignty. Raymond Vernon's famous quote that 
"suddenly the sovereign states are feeling naked"" is an overstatement 
at one end of the spectrum. But I think the opposite extreme is also 
dangerous. If we say that multinational companies are now at the mercy 
of every single developing country in the world, and that the major 
capital-exporting countries are also at the mercy of the underdeveloped 
countries, that is a gross overstatement. 12 I think that in all these areas, 
the truth lies somewhere in between. I guess the appropriate thing to 
say is "To be continued this afternoon to find the answer." 
DEAN BEACH: Well, I would like to thank the three panelists for a 
very entertaining and informative discussion. I would like to thank the 
people in the audience who did brave our Syracuse elements to come out 
and listen to it. May I point out that many of the concepts discussed 
here overlap the afternoon topic entitled "Expropriation, Threats of 
Expropriation and Developmental Policy." Knowing nothing about in-
11 . R. VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY 1 (1971). 
12. It has been reported that Saudi Arabia will boost its participation in Aramco from 
25% to 60%. Wall St. J., June 11 , 1974, at 3, col. 1. 
For a review of the attempts to establish a banana exporting cartel similar to OPEC 
see Morgenthaler, Banana Tax Causes A Bunch of Trouble in Central America, Wall. St. 
J., June 13, 1974, at 1, col. 4. 
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ternational law, I came to learn something about it. I have heard a great 
deal about international power. At lunch, I am going to try to figure out 
if that is indeed a distinction without a difference. Thank you for being 
here . 
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